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potential needs to be balanced against lower income debtors’ need for
credit and the corresponding benefits resulting from access to credit
provided by alternative credit markets, such as the payday lending market.
Unlike the United States, where payday lenders have more locations than
Starbucks and McDonalds combined, and payday lending regulation is up
there with Vampire Weekend and the Tipping Point as an attention
grabbing pop-culture reference, payday lending is relatively new,
underdeveloped and unregulated in Canada. Over the last year, in the
wake of a recent amendment to the Canadian Criminal Code, that would
see payday lenders exempted from the 60 per cent criminal rate of interest
in provinces where payday lenders are provincially regulated, Canadian
provinces have began to regulate and put forth regulatory proposals for a
previously unregulated area. This exercise has been attempted in the
context of limited recent domestic analysis of the payday lending industry,
borrowers and regulatory options. Accordingly, this article sets out to fill
this void. The article draws on the American experience with payday
lending and payday lending regulation, and also a first-hand experience of
attempting to obtain a payday loan in Toronto, Ontario, to evaluate the
current provincial reform efforts.
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REGULATING PAYDAY LENDERS
DRAWING ON AMERICAN LESSONS

IN

CANADA:

Stephanie Ben-Ishai*

Payday loans are a relatively new phenomenon in Canada. They are
typically short-term, single-payment loans: the lender agrees to lend the
debtor a certain amount of money, in return for the promise of repayment
(usually on a cheque from the debtor, post-dated to the date of his or her
next paycheque) and certain fees. Payday lending has been vilified in
recent media coverage of subprime or fringe lending. Often payday
lending is described as “predatory.” Three key arguments are made in
support of the “predatory” label: payday lenders charge too much money;
payday lenders target the poor; and payday lenders lie to customers (or
omit information). At the same time, payday lending, like other forms of
fringe lending in the past, plays a role in servicing and giving access to
credit to an otherwise neglected segment of the market: minority and
disenfranchised groups.
In the wake of a recent amendment to the federal Criminal Code that
would see payday lenders exempted from the 60 per cent criminal rate of
interest in provinces where payday lenders are provincially regulated,
Canadian provinces have begun to regulate and put forth regulatory
proposals for a previously unregulated area. This exercise has been
attempted in the context of limited recent domestic analysis of the payday
lending industry, borrowers and regulatory options. Accordingly, this
article sets out to fill this void by drawing on the American experience
with payday lending and payday lending regulation, and also a first-hand
experience of attempting to obtain a payday loan in Toronto, Ontario.
First an introduction to the “payday lending debate” is provided. Second,
*

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I am
grateful for comments from Tony Duggan, Benjamin Geva, Stephen Lubben, Jacob
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the business model for payday lenders operating in Canada is set out.
Third, the evolving Canadian regulatory scheme is outlined. The fourth
section of the article documents six attempts to obtain loans from payday
lenders in Toronto, Ontario. The fifth section of the article provides an
analysis of the American tools used for regulating payday lenders. The
sixth section of the article evaluates the evolving Canadian regulatory
scheme in light of lessons drawn from the use of the various regulatory
tools in the United States and the visits to Canadian payday lenders. Part
seven concludes with reflections on two possible directions for future
research: the role of Canadian corporate and securities law and the
corporate social responsibility movement in facilitating a change in the
practices of payday lenders and the potential of American Community
Reinvestment Act style legislation in Canada.

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYDAY LENDING
One of the most common forms of attack leveled against payday lenders
begins with the author recounting the story of a borrower, usually a
woman of modest means, often of a minority group, who takes out a
payday loan for a small amount to make ends meet and ends up paying
thousands of dollars in fees without ever paying off the principal.1 The
interest charged by payday lenders is generally over 400 per cent annual
percentage rate (APR),2 and other fees including rollover or extension fees

1

See for example: Patricia Turner ended up paying $840 in extension fees for a $300
loan which she was not able to pay down in Charles Bruch, “Taking the Pay Out of
Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates
Charged by Payday Lenders” (2001) 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1257; Sandra Harris’s
experience with payday lenders resulted in her car being repossessed and wages garnered
in Michael Bertics, “Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank
Involvement” (2005) 9 N.C. Banking Inst. 133; most newspaper articles on payday
lenders also start with a similar story, like Margaret Smith in “Caught in the Loan Trap:
Paying it Back Can Become a Vicious Circle” (19 June 2004) Toronto Star.
2
Creola Johnson, “Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?” (2002) 87
Minn. L. Rev. 1 at 27; Kathleen E. Keest & Elizabeth Renuart, The Cost of Credit:
Regulation and Legal Challenges, 2d ed. (Boston: National Consumer Law Center, 2000)
at 297; Aaron Huckstep, “Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean
Outrageous Profits?” (2006) 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 203 at 208; in Canada the
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can further increase the cost of a loan. Given that in Canada, the federal
criminal usury rate is 60 per cent, the rates charged even by compliant
payday lenders are far above what mainstream credit providers charge.
Because the rate of interest charged is so high, the payday lending
transaction has been described as “one-sided,” and not extending any real
benefit to payday loan consumers.3 Further, payday lenders structure their
loans in such a way as to be most profitable to them. For example, the
date on which the loan is due is usually the day before the borrower’s
paycheque arrives, so lenders are able to charge additional fees for
repayment after the due date.4
Even if these fees and interest were reasonable for a single transaction, the
fact that the majority of payday lenders are repeat customers means that
many borrowers are trapped in the scheme for the long haul.5 Instead of
encouraging customers to pay off their debt, payday lenders extend loans
(for a hefty fee) or allow borrowers to take out new loans to repay the old
ones;6 many payday lenders encourage customers to take out multiple
loans at the same time.7 In fact, the very nature of the payday loan and its
short duration (typically two weeks), means that rolling over loans is often
inevitable for payday borrowers.8 This rollover feature can cause
consumers to “accumulate an unmanageable cycle of debt.”9
As two American commentators argue, payday lenders “feed off poverty
and financial exclusion.”10 For example, the average American payday
loan customer is likely to be a member of a minority group from an inner
city neighborhood.11 Some sources (often payday lenders or organizations
situation is similar, as reflected in Protecting Canadians’ Interest: Reining in the Payday
Lending Industry (ACORN Canada: Vancouver, 2004) at 1 [“ACORN Report”].
3
Bruch, supra note 1 at 1279.
4
ACORN Report, supra note 2 at 10.
5
Bruch, supra note 1 at 1280; Huckstep, supra note 2 at 208.
6
Bruch, supra note 1 at 1281.
7
Bertics, supra note 1 at 138-9.
8
Ibid. at 138.
9
Carmen Butler & Niloufar Park, “Mayday Payday: Can Corporate Social Responsibility
Save Payday Lenders?” (2005) 3 Rutgers J.L. & Urb. Pol’y 119 at 122.
10
H. Palmer, Profiting from Poverty: Why Debt is Big Business in Britain (New
Economics Foundation: London, 2002).
11
Laurie Burlingame, “A Pro-Consumer Approach to Predatory Lending: Enhanced
Protection Through Federal Legislation and New Approaches to Education” (2006) 60
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representing them) paint a more flattering picture of payday borrowers,
suggesting that payday customers make an average salary of around
$35,000, a third of them own their homes, and that they have been in their
jobs and homes for around 4 years.12 However, this description of the
demographic is discredited by most academics, as numbers like that are
sometimes reflective of county-wide averages rather than actual payday
loan customers.13
Often, payday loan customers have low fixed incomes.14 Their income
leaves little room for coping with emergencies or additional expenses.
The target customers for payday lenders rarely have the surplus in their
budget they would need to pay back the interest fees charged by the
lenders – if they did, they would not be turning to payday lenders in the
first place.15
One of the other accusations most often levied against payday lenders is
that they prevent customers from making educated choices or shopping
around because they are not clear about the fees they charge. Many
payday lenders hide basic information about their loans from customers.16
Payday lenders have also been known to avoid disclosure of information
like interest rates or finance charges until right before the agreement is to
be signed.17 According to one study, payday lenders in Ohio do not
typically disclose the triple digit interest rates they charge until after the
payday loan agreement is signed.18 Other American payday loan
providers refused to respond to an oral request from a borrower who
Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 460 at 462; Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen Keest, “The TwoTiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its
Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society” (2000)
51 S.C. L. Rev. 589 at 591.
12
Drysdale &Keest, ibid. at 627.
13
Ibid. at 629.
14
Ibid. at 630, 631-2; Kurt Eggert “Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How SelfLimitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders from Predatory Lending” (2003) 36 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 693.
15
Bruch, supra note 1 at 1280.
16
Bertics, supra note 1 at 139 citing Johnson, supra note 2 at 32; Butler, supra note 9 at
121.
17
Christopher L. Peterson, “Truth, Understanding, and High Cost Consumer Credit: The
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act” (2003) 55 Fla. L. Rev. 807 at 898.
18
Johnson, supra note 2 at 32.
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wanted to know the APR of their loan.19 In another survey, only 37 per
cent of payday lenders gave an “even marginally accurate APR” when a
telephone inquiry was made about the cost of credit.20
The misleading advertising is even more egregious in situations where
there is a legitimately better option – for example, in the context of the
American military, where active duty personnel can receive interest-free
emergency loans but still turn to payday lenders because of their
“powerful marketing campaigns.”21
Even for borrowers who are somewhat aware that there are statutory limits
on interest that can be charged (in some American states, and in Canada
until the amendments to s. 347 of the Criminal Code), payday lenders can
still convince them to borrow without violating their rights since they will
often charge very little “interest” and collect the remainder of their money
as various types of fees.22 However, where the issue has been litigated,
courts have recognized that these fees are interest, and generally classified
them as such when deciding cases.23
There remains an upside to payday lending. Consider the role that payday
lending plays in servicing and giving access to credit to an otherwise
neglected segment of the market. Many customers of payday loans feel

19

Jean Ann Fox & Edmund Mierzwinski, “Rent-A-Bank: How Banks Help Payday
Lenders Evade State Consumer Protections,” the 2001 Payday Lender Survey and Report,
(CFA
&
State
Public
Interest
Research
Groups),
online:
<http://www.uspirg.org/reports/rentabank/paydayreportnov13.pdf> at 13.
20
Bruch, supra note 1 at 1284.
21
Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11 at 630-1.
22
ACORN report, supra note 2 at 11; Bruch, supra note 1 at 1276.
23
Bruch, supra note 1 at 1276; Drysdale & Keest, supra note 11 at 642. The issue has
not been fully litigated in Canada, however it is notable that a number of class actions
have been recently certified based on restitutionary claims arising from the alleged
charging of criminal rates of interest (under the earlier version of section 347 of the
Criminal Code) on payday loans. See: McCutcheon v. The Cash Store Inc., [2006] O.J.
No. 1860 (S.C.J.); Smith v. National Money Mart Co., [2007] O.J. No. 46 (S.C.J.);
MacKinnon v. National Money Mart Co., [2005] B.C.J. No. 399 (S.C.); Kilroy v. A OK
Payday Loans Inc., [2006] B.C.J. No. 1885 (S.C.); Bodnar v. Payroll Loans Ltd., [2006]
B.C.J. No. 1705 (S.C.); Tracy v. Instaloans Financial Solutions Centres (B.C.) Ltd.,
[2006] B.C.J. No. 1639 (S.C.); Bodnar v. The Cash Store Inc., [2005] B.C.J. No. 1904
(S.C.); and Ayrton v. PRL Financial (Alta.) Ltd., [2006] A.J. No. 296 (C.A.).
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they have nowhere else to go.24 Payday lenders target consumers who
have low income and too little collateral to borrow from a bank.25 Banks
also do not offer short-term, small loans, and very often payday loan
customers are not able to qualify for a credit card.26 Customers frequently
need the money for an emergency or unexpected expense,27 and are unable
to find another source of credit with which to meet the cost. Pawnbrokers
require something to pawn, and borrowing from family members may be
too embarrassing or difficult.28 Though payday lenders do charge a high
rate of interest, some have argued that they are still cheaper than writing a
cheque that is returned dishonoured,29 and to completely outlaw payday
lenders may force this vulnerable group to turn to loan sharks and more
criminal lenders.30
Payday lenders are also quick and easy to access, and make minority and
disenfranchised groups feel more at ease. Sometimes, customers will
choose payday loans over a bank because they are more friendly and
accessible, providing more immediate liquidity.31 Other times, banks are
just too inconvenient – payday lenders have more flexible hours than
banks, and better locations.32 For example, in Toronto and Vancouver,
banks have tended to close more branches in lower income areas, and
“payday lenders are moving aggressively into this competitive vacuum.”33
Payday lenders also make more of an effort to solicit the local community

24

Scott Andrew Schaaf, “From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending
Industry” (2001) 5 N.C. Banking Inst. 339 at 344; Iain Ramsay, “Access to Credit in the
Alternative Consumer Credit Market” (Paper prepared for Office of Consumer Affairs,
Industry Canada, February 2000), online: <http://cmsweb.ca/epic/internet/incmccmc.nsf/vwapj/ramsay_e.pdf/$FILE/ramsay_e.pdf> at 17.
25
Butler & Park, supra note 9 at 123.
26
Schaaf, supra note 24 at 343.
27
Ibid. at 346.
28
Huckstep, supra note 2 at 209.
29
Schaaf, supra note 24 at 344
30
Ibid. at 344.
31
Ibid. at 344.
32
Susan MacDonnell, Losing Ground: The Persistent Growth of Family Poverty in
Canada’s Largest City (Toronto: United Way of Greater Toronto, 2007) at 49.
33
ACORN report, supra note 2 at 15.
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than banks, and will often have employees who speak the language of the
dominant ethnic group of the neighbourhood.34

II. THE BUSINESS MODEL FOR PAYDAY LENDERS IN
CANADA
The main line of business for payday lenders is, as the name implies,
making payday loans. Those are typically short-term, single-payment
loans: The lender agrees to lend the debtor a certain amount of money, in
return for the promise of repayment (usually on a cheque from the debtor,
post-dated to the date of his or her next paycheque) and certain fees. The
fees are typically $15-25 per $100 of loan granted, and are fixed without
regard to the term of the loan;35 it costs a consumer on average $50 to take
out a $300 loan for 14 days.36 The average loan is about $280 for around a
period of 10 days.37
The lender determines the creditworthiness of the debtor through basic
documentation – proof of identity that shows the borrower has attained the
age of majority and the borrower’s address, and proof of a steady income
and a chequing account.38 Many payday lenders advertise that they do not

34

Lesly Jean-Paul & Luxman Nathan, “Check Cashers: Moving from the Fringes to the
Financial Mainstream, Communities and Banking” (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
Boston, Mass.), Summer 1999, online: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
<http://www.bos.frb.org/comaff/pdf/summer99.pdf> at 9.
35
See Nicole MacIntyre, “A Maze of Fast Cash and Fees” Toronto Star (2 November
2007), online: <http://www.thestar.com/News/article/279327>. For example, Money
Mart, an “industry leader” according to the Toronto Star, charges $18.94/$100/1 week;
Speedy Cash charges $25 per $100 borrowed. See also Iain Ramsay, “Access to Credit in
the Alternative Consumer Credit Market” (Paper prepared for Office of Consumer
Affairs,
Industry
Canada,
February
2000),
online:
<http://dsppsd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/C2-543-2000E.pdf>, though older suggests the same fees at
ii.
36
MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 48.
37
“What is a Payday Loan?” (Hamilton: Canadian Payday Loan Association, 2008)
online: <http://www.cpla-acps.ca/english/aboutloans.php>.
38
See, for example, payday loan providers like Payday Cash Advance Loans (online:
<http://www.paydaycashadvanceloans.biz/faq.asp>) and Speedy Cash (<online:
http://www.speedycash.ca/SC-cash-advances-payday-loans-howitworks.php>).
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perform a credit check.39 In the case of default, practices vary, but few
payday lenders will turn to litigation as the loans are for small amounts,
and the likelihood of enforcing judgment against a defaulting payday
borrower is low.40 Loans that cannot be recovered are written off by
lenders as a bad debt expense.41 Despite the risks in the industry, in
Canada, the annual profit for payday lenders in 2004 was estimated at $1
billion.42
Between the costs of bad debt, and the overhead and other costs of running
a payday lending business, the average Canadian firm incurs a cost of
$20.66 per $100 of loans.43 However, big loan operators have lower costs
than smaller “mom-and-pop” operations, and if their market share is
accounted for in creating a weighted average, the average cost is only
$15.69 per $100 loan.44
Naturally, profits per loan are higher for repeat customers than for firsttime borrowers, as the costs of opening a new client file and verifying
employment information have already been incurred. The cost of a new
loan is $29.35 per $100 in a weighted average of payday lenders across
Canada, while rollover or repeat loans only cost $14.15 in the same
study.45 This means that as stores mature and gain more repeat business,
they become significantly more profitable.46

39

Such as National Cash, (online: <http://www.apaydayloan.ca/ontariopaydayloan.php>)
and Speedy Cash, (online: <http://www.speedycash.ca/SC-cash-advances-payday-loanshowitworks.php>).
40
Ramsay, supra note 24 at 18.
41
The Cost of Providing Payday Loans in Canada (Ernst & Young: 2004) at 4 [“Ernst &
Young Report”].
42
MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 49.
43
Ernst & Young Report, supra note 41 at 29.
44
Ibid. at 31.
45
Ibid. at 7, 34, 36.
46
See ibid.; see also Chris Robinson, Regulation of Payday Lending in Canada (ACORN
Canada:
Vancouver,
2006),
online:
<http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Centers/Press/Report/Payday_
Lending_Canada.pdf#search=per
cent22acorn%C20study%C20payday%C20lenders%C20canada%22>; see also James
Daw, “Consumer Protection in the Wind on Payday Loans” Toronto Star (30 May 2006)
at D6 (discussing the Robinson report).
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Fortunately for payday lenders, the debtors who use payday lenders are
often repeat customers – Ernst & Young estimated that first-time
borrowers end up taking out an average of fifteen loans.47 This desire for
repeat customers can be seen through their behaviour as many payday loan
companies encourage customer loyalty; one goes as far as offering a “no
fee” third loan as a bonus for customer loyalty.48
In Canada, typical borrowers are either young, single men, or young
families with children,49 though other studies (commissioned by the
payday lending industry) have found the average age of borrowers to
range from 38 in Manitoba to 40 in British Colombia.50 They tend to be
low-income, but employed, since proof of employment is required for
many loans.51 Families with little savings or no credit cards, particularly
those who had been refused, were significantly more likely to have used
payday loans.52
Families with outstanding bill or loan payments were more than four times
as likely to have used payday loans, even after controlling for other key
characteristics such as income and savings.53 Four in ten families who
borrowed money through payday loans had spending that exceeded
income, substantially more than families who had not used payday loans.54
Almost half of families who used payday loans had no one to turn to if
47

Cited in MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 48.
McIntyre, supra note 1.
49
MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 49. The Canadian Survey of Financial Security indicates
that young families were three times more likely to have used payday loans than those
aged 35 to 44, after controlling for other family characteristics.
See:
<http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/75-001-XIE/10407/art-1.htm#Kitching>.
The
Survey of Financial Security covered about 5,300 families and collected information on
the assets and debts of families and individuals between May and July 2005.
50
Payday Loan Customer Service – Manitoba (Pollara: 2007) online: Canadian Payday
Loan
Association
<http://www.cplaacps.ca/english/reports/MB%20Pollara%20Poll%20Sept%202007.pdf> at 3, Payday
Loan Customer Service – British Columbia (Pollara: 2007) online: Canadian Payday
Loan
Association
<http://www.cplaacps.ca/english/reports/3631%20BC%20CPLA%20Report%20FINAL%20(Oct%2026).p
df> at 3.
51
MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 49.
52
See <http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/75-001-XIE/10407/art-1.htm#Kitching>.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
48
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they faced financial difficulty.55 More than one-quarter reported that they
could not handle an unforeseen expenditure of $500, and nearly half could
not handle one of $5,000. 56
Payday lenders have primarily retail store locations, “tucked in between
variety and convenience store outlets.”57 Their main appeal is that they
provide cash instantly, without a hold period, and that they are “nonjudgmental” and friendlier than banks; often, payday lenders will ensure
they have employees who speak the language of the local community to
increase their appeal.58 That these business choices make a difference to
borrowers can be seen through a recent survey of payday users in Ontario
conducted on behalf of the Canadian Payday Lending Association, the
majority of whom stated that they used payday lenders because they are
quick and easy.59
Payday lenders are not a homogenous group. There are a few larger
chains, and a number of smaller providers, some of which are being
acquired by national chains (and have been since 2000),60 and not every
payday lender is structured the same way. There is the traditional model,
where the payday loan outlet is lending its own money. There is also the
broker model, where the payday lender covers the overhead costs, but is
lending out a third party’s money; the third party bears the risk of a loan
default. Finally, in the insurance model, the lender charges a fixed fee for
the loans, and an additional insurance premium charge which is designed
to cover the costs of the loan and the risk of a default; the insurance
company which assumes this fee is usually owned by the same payday
loan operator.61

55

Ibid.
Ibid.
57
MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 43.
58
Ibid. at 49; Ramsay, supra note 24 at 17.
59
Payday Loan Customer Service – Ontario (Pollara: 2007) online: Canadian Payday
Loan
Association,
<http://www.cplaacps.ca/english/reports/3631%20Ontario%20CPLA%20Report%20FINAL%20(Oct%202
6).pdf> at 11 and 15.
60
Ramsay, supra note 24 at ii.
61
Ernst & Young Report, supra note 41 at 7.
56
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III. THE REGULATORY SCHEME GOVERNING PAYDAY
LENDERS
A. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The main federal legislation governing payday lenders is found in s. 347
of the Criminal Code, which prohibits entering into arrangements or
receiving payment of interest at a criminal rate.62 A criminal rate is
defined as any interest rate of over 60 per cent per annum; interest
includes all charges and expenses, such as fees or penalties, but not
official fees or overdraft charges, for example.63 However, that legislation
was drafted to aid police in prosecutions of loan sharks, rather than as
consumer protection legislation.64 There have been two attempts to
change the status of the section federally and make it more directed
towards payday lenders. The first, Bill S-19, failed due to an election.65
Bill C-26, however, came into force after receiving Royal Assent on May
3, 2007. The Bill defines payday loans as “an advancement of money in
exchange for a post-dated cheque, a preauthorized debit or a future
payment of a similar nature but not for any guarantee, suretyship,
overdraft protection or security on property and not through a margin loan,
pawnbroking, a line of credit or a credit card.”66 It then exempts payday
loans for under $1500 and for fewer than 62 days from the scope of the
Criminal Code, allowing for provincial regulation of the area, if the
province exercises its option to regulate under the new s. 347.1(3).67
Essentially, the province must regulate to protect payday borrowers, at
which point the Governor in Council will designate the province under the
section, or allow it to “opt-out.”

62

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 347(1).
Ibid., s. 347(2).
64
Mary Anne Waldron, “Section 347 of the Criminal Code: ‘A Deeply Problematic
Law’” (Paper presented to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, August 2003) online:
<http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/Section-347-Criminal-Code.pdf> at para 2-3, 11.
65
Jennifer Babe, “Section 347 of the Criminal Code of Canada: Business Law Problems
Remain” (Paper presented to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, September 2007)
at 4.
66
Criminal Code, supra note 23, s. 347.1(1)
67
Ibid., ss. 347.1(2) and (3).
63
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Some provinces have subsequently taken steps to regulate payday lenders,
though a few still have not. The provinces that have not yet attempted to
regulate payday lenders are: Newfoundland and Labrador, the Northwest
Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon (though there possible amendments are
under review). The other provinces all have regulation, either in force or
pending.

B. PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION
1. OVERVIEW

The following is an overview of the recent provincial efforts to regulate
payday lenders. The chart found in Appendix A provides a detailed
comparison of the provincial regulation. Bill C-26 provides some
direction as that what is required under the provincial regulation, however,
it leaves room for the provinces to be designated and opt out of the federal
regime with different approaches to regulation. Bill C-26 requires a
licensing or other type of authorization system for lenders, the
establishment of limits on the total cost of borrowing, and a framework of
protections for consumers. In seeking to fit within the Bill C-26
requirements for designation, the following five components are provided
for in most provinces’ legislation, although there is variation among the
provinces in how this is done:
a.

Interest Rate Caps: Each province’s regulation gives
either the province, through regulation, or a body, such as
the Energy Commission, the ability to set an interest rate
cap. With the exception of Quebec, which has set its
interest rate cap at 35 per cent, and Manitoba, which has set
its interest rate cap at 17 per cent the other provinces have
not yet set interest rate caps.

b.

Cancellation Protection: One to two business days is
provided by each province for borrower cancellation rights.

c.

Information in Agreement: There is variation among the
provinces. Some provinces require disclosure of the cost of
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the loan and how this is done varies. Other provinces only
require a statement that the loan is a high cost loan.
d.

Rollover Prohibitions: Each province prohibits rollovers
or charging an additional fee for a rollover.

e.

Licensing: Each province requires licensing of payday
lenders and the requirements for licensing range from
payment of a fee to sample loan documents. The licensor
differs from province to province.

f.

Posted Warning: With the exception of one province that
has the ability to regulate this and has not done so and
another province that does not provide for this component
of the legislation, all provinces require disclosure of the
cost of credit. One province requires disclosure that the
indicating that the loans are high cost loans.

g.

Remedies: Remedies range from an administrative penalty
of up to $10,000 to not being required to pay any amount
over the principal amount borrowed.

2. ALBERTA

In their 2007 budget, the government of Alberta designated as one of its
goals the reform of the Fair Trading Act to address marketplace issues
around payday lenders.68 It intends to regulate payday lenders through
regulations passed pursuant to that Act, but it is still in consultations at this
point.

68

“Budget 2007: Goal 2” (Government of Alberta: 2007) online: Ministry of Finance
http://www.finance.gov.ab.ca/publications/budget/budget2007/service_ab.html.
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3. BRITISH COLUMBIA

In British Columbia, the Bill69 to regulate payday lenders was given royal
assent on November 22, 2007 and amends the Business Practices and
Consumer Protection (Payday Loans) Amendment Act.70 The Bill adds a
Part 6.1 to the Business Practices and Consumer Act, with the title of
“Payday Loans.” This part allows the Lieutenant Governor in Council to
set a maximum cost for payday loans and requires payday lenders to be
licensed.71 It also sets out a host of rights for payday loan consumers,
including the right to cancel the loan before the end of the subsequent day
or if it does not satisfy the written notice requirements;72 sets out clear
disclosure requirements;73 and prohibits rollovers and second loans while
Licensing and compliance enforcement will be
loans already exist.74
administered by the Business Practices and Consumer Protection
Authority, a not-for-profit organization that operates at arm's length from
government.
4. MANITOBA

After the changes to the Criminal Code, Manitoba made changes to the
Consumer Protection Act75 through the Consumer Protection Amendment
Act (Payday Loans).76 These changes require licensing for payday lenders,
and require them to give warnings to their customers about the costs of
borrowing. The Act also authorizes the Manitoba Public Utility Board to
set out a maximum cost of credit for payday loans, and prohibits additional
fees on renewals, extensions, or new loans to replace old loans, unless
otherwise authorized by the Board. The new Act also prohibits signing
over of future wages and title loans, and gives the right to cancel a loan
within 48 hours without penalty. Finally, the Manitoba Consumers
69

Bill 27, Business Practices and Consumer Protection (Payday Loans) Amendment Act,
3d Sess., 38th Parl., British Columbia, 2007.
70
S.B.C. 2004, c. 2.
71
Ibid., s. 112.02.
72
Ibid., s. 112.05.
73
Ibid., s. 112.06.
74
Ibid., s. 112.08(1)(a) and (b).
75
C.C.S.M. c. C-200.
76
S.M. 2006, c. 31.
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Bureau has the right to inspect licensed premises, and to access unlicensed
operations if there is evidence that payday loans are being made there.77
Pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act, Manitoba has drafted the
Payday Loans Regulation.78 This regulation specifies the licensing
process and bonding requirements for payday lenders, and stipulates the
information that must be in a loan agreement.79 It also requires payday
lenders to post signs with clear warnings that “payday loans are high cost
loans” and other information about the costs of payday lenders.80 Section
147(1) of the Consumer Protection also provides the Manitoba Public
Utilities Board with the ability to set a limit on the costs of credit given by
payday lenders. The Board set a 17 per cent interest rate cap on April 4,
2008.81
5. NEW BRUNSWICK

In New Brunswick, Bill 4, An Act Respecting Payday Loans,82 passed the
second reading as of December 12, 2007. Like the other provinces, the
Bill is designed to protect payday borrowers through licensing and
bonding requirements for payday lenders,83 informational requirements on
the payday loan itself (including all fees and penalties charged),84 no-fee
cancellation options,85 posted information about the cost of loans,86 and it
grants the government the ability to limit the cost of credit.87

77

“Province Announces Next Steps in Payday Loan Regulation” online: Government of
Manitoba, <http://news.gov.mb.ca/news/index.html?archive=2007-6-01&item=1751>.
78
Man. Reg. 99/2007.
79
Ibid., s. 14.
80
Ibid., s. 16(3).
81
Consumer Protection Act, supra note 75, Part XVIII. The interest rate cap was
introduced by the Manitoba Public Utilities Board Act Order 39/08 online:
http://www.pub.gov.mb.ca/pdf/misc/39-08.pdf.
82
2d Sess., 56th Parl., New Brunswick, 2007. This Bill will amend the Cost of Credit
Disclosure Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-28.3.
83
Ibid., ss. 37.12; 37.15.
84
Ibid., ss. 37.28(2)(m).
85
Ibid., s. 37.29.
86
Ibid., s. 37.3.
87
Ibid., s. 37.31.
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6. NOVA SCOTIA

The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board is currently in consultations to
determine the limits to be set on payday lending. To that end, they held
public hearings in January 2008 to consider preliminary issues including
the maximum cost of borrowing and the maximum fees or rates that could
be charged by payday lenders.88
The authority to embark on these consultations was granted by the
Consumer Protection Act (amended), which received Royal Assent on
November 23, 2006.89 Sections 18A-18U of that Act provide for similar
protections to all other provinces. There is a permit requirement for
payday lenders,90 informational requirements in the loan agreement,91 and
cancellation provisions.92 The Act also grants the Nova Scotia Utilities
and Review Board the ability to set a maximum cost of borrowing and
other controls.93
7. ONTARIO

In Ontario, amendments to the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 requiring
greater disclosure by payday lenders are already in effect. They pertain to
the posting of a disclosure poster that must indicate certain pieces of
information. For instance, payday lenders must display the cost per
hundred dollars of the loans they grant. They also require that payday
lenders display the cost of a “$300 loan over a period of 14 days.”94
Further changes also require a standard form for payday loans which will
also provide greater information to the consumer.95
88

Nova Scotia Utilities Review Board, “Payday Loans, Notice of Public Hearings”
online:
Canadian
Payday
Loan
Association
<http://www.cplaacps.ca/english/reports/NS%20-Payday_Loans_Notice.pdf>.
89
S.N.S., 2006, c.25.
90
Ibid., ss. 18C-G.
91
Ibid., ss. 18I-N.
92
Ibid., s. 18Q.
93
Ibid., s. 18T.
94
O. Reg. 17/05 as am by O. Reg. 187/07 61.1. According to 61.1 there is no
requirement to have the APR disclosed on the poster, the only requirement is that it is
disclosed in the loan agreement itself.
95
Ibid., s. 62.1.
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Most recently, on March 31, 2008 the Government announced Bill 48:
Payday Loans Act,96 which will be in addition to the provisions in the
Consumer Protection Act, 2002. It requires all payday lenders and brokers
to be licensed and establishes a Registrar to inspect lenders and enforce
provisions under the Act.97 The Act seeks to protect borrowers by
prohibiting lenders from making misleading claims about the total cost of
borrowing.98 It also provides for a two-day cancellation period where the
borrower can cancel the loan agreement and pay back the advance.99 The
lender is forced to return all documents and fees pertaining to the cost of
borrowing, without penalty. The Act also provides for very broad
regulations pertaining to the specific responsibilities of licensees,
governing their activities, setting limits that payday lenders and brokers
may charge and governing the required contents for payday loan
agreements.100 Remedies include: a rebate on the cost of borrowing for
borrowers who entered into agreements not consistent with the Act,
freezing of assets of delinquent lenders,101 and the imposition of
administrative penalties not exceeding $10,000.102
Finally, the Act established a special fund, known as the Ontario Payday
Lending Education Fund (OPLEF), to educate borrowers about their rights
under the Act.103 The OPLEF will be a non-profit corporation and will be
funded in part by the payday lenders and brokers. The OPLEF is required
to report on its activities and administration through an annual report to
the Minister who will then deposit the report with the Assembly.104
Ontario is the only province to include an educational component in its
legislation.

96

Bill 48, Payday Loans Act, 1st Sess., 39th Parl., Ontario, 2008 (first reading on March
31, 2008).
97
Ibid., s. 5.
98
Ibid., s. 26(1).
99
Ibid., s. 30(1).
100
Ibid., s. 77.
101
Ibid., s. 52(1).
102
Ibid., s. 59(1)-(3).
103
Ibid., s. 66-67.
104
Ibid., s. 74.
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The Minister hailed the new legislation as an attempt to balance protecting
consumers while supporting a legitimate industry to continue to grow.105
When pressed on why the legislation does not contain a clear
unambiguous interest rate cap, the Minister said more information was
required. He established an independent expert panel, representing
business and poverty activists, to examine the rate cap and report at a later
date.106
A number of Members of Parliament, such as Andrea Horwath, have
already criticized the Bill as not going far enough to protect consumers.107
She believes that an interest rate cap should be clearly included in the Bill
as well as a 30 day “cooling-off” period for rescission.108 Another
Member of Parliament, Cheri DiNovo, states that "We don't need payday
lenders. Payday lenders are usurious. These are unnecessary services and
they leech off the poor."109 Howard Hampton, leader of the provincial
NDP Party, called the legislation superficial and criticized the government
as being “scared” to put the payday loan industry out-of-business with an
interest rate cap.110
Representatives from ACORN Canada (Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now) again stressed the importance of an
interest rate cap— "It's either going to protect people and keep money
from getting sucked out of low-income neighbourhoods or not, depending
on what the interest rate is.”111 Other poverty activists stressed the need
for education that would actually find its way to the most vulnerable
consumers.112 They recommend starting education campaigns in payday
locations or through different anti-poverty groups. However, poverty
105

Interview of Government Services Minister Ted McMeekin, (1 April 2008) on Metro
Morning, CBC Radio, Toronto, CBC Radio Archives.
106
Ibid.
107
First Reading of Bill 48, Debates and Proceedings, March 31, 2008
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/house-proceedings/house_detail.do?Date=2008-0331&Parl=39&Sess=1&locale=en#PARA139>.
108
Ibid.
109
Joanna Smith and Robert Benzie, “Payday loan crackdown” Toronto Star (April 1,
2008), online: The Star <http://www.thestar.com/News/Ontario/article/407813>.
110
Supra note 16.
111
Supra note 20.
112
Interview of Miryam Zeballos, (1 April 2008) on Metro Morning, CBC Radio,
Toronto, CBC Radio Archives.
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activists were quick to note that the education can only go so far when
consumers are also placed with crushing time-pressures in paying back the
loan within several days.113 The Canadian Payday Loan Association
(“CPLA”) remains silent on the new legislation, as of April 1, 2008.
However, in an interview CPLA President Stan Keyes, applauded the Bill
as a right balance.114 Keyes refused to comment on an “interest rate cap
based on APR”, calling it a meaningless number.115 However, he does
support the use of fee caps of between $20-23 per $100 loan.116
8. PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

PEI’s Bill 100, Payday Loans Act, has not yet moved past the first reading,
which occurred in the spring 2006 legislative session.117 However, if
passed, the Bill will implement many of the same changes seen in the
other provinces, including licensing,118 maximum cost of credit,119 getting
appropriate information to the consumer,120 and penalty-free cancellation
within the first 48 hours.121
9. QUEBEC

Quebec’s Consumer Protection Act requires that a lender have a license to
operate there, and courts have decided to only grant licenses if creditor
charges less than 35 per cent interest rate, because the loan is otherwise
unconscionable under s. 8 and so can be denied under s. 325.122 There are
no payday lenders legally operating in Quebec.123

113

Ibid.
Supra note 16.
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117 th
4 Sess., 62nd Parl., Prince Edward Island, 2007.
118
Ibid., s. 10.
119
Ibid., s. 11.
120
Ibid., s. 12.
121
Ibid., s. 13.
122
R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, ss. 8, 325.
123
Government of Ontario, “New Payday Lending Rules Now in Effect Across Ontario”
online:
Ministry
of
Government
and
Consumer
Services
114
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10. SASKATCHEWAN

Like the other provinces that have sought to regulate payday lenders,
Saskatchewan provides similar protections to borrowers in the province.
An Act Respecting Payday Loan Agreements, Payday Lenders and
Borrowers received royal assent and came into effect in May 2007.124 It
has licensing requirements for lenders,125 disclosure requirements for the
protection of borrowers through public signage126 and the credit
agreement,127 and allows the province to set a maximum rate for credit.128
However, again, the maximum has not yet been set by regulation.

C. SELF-REGULATION BY PAYDAY LENDERS
The CPLA is the largest Canadian association of payday lenders, and
claims to represent 500 of the 1350 payday lending stores in Canada.129 It
claims that its Code of Best Business Practices (“Code”) is recognized as
the “world’s toughest voluntary code of conduct,” and it has recently set
up a Commissioner of Ethics and Integrity, whose job it is to
independently enforce the practices in the Code.130
The Code, first and foremost, prohibits rollover loans, which are widely
decried by industry critics.131 In doing so, it specifically bars members
<http://ogov.newswire.ca/ontario/GPOE/2007/08/01/c2939.html?lmatch=&lang=_e.html
>.
124
2007, c. P-4.3.
125
Ibid., Part II.
126
Ibid., s. 21.
127
Ibid., s. 18.
128
Ibid., s. 23.
129
Office of the Ethics and Integrity Commissioner, “Annual Report 2006-2007”
(Canadian
Payday
Loan
Association:
Hamilton,
2008)
online:
<http://www.cplaethicscommissioner.ca/english/pdf/OEIC_CPLA_AnnualReport_0607.p
df> [“Annual Report”].
130
“Canadian Payday Loan Association Appoints Former Law Enforcement Official Sid
Peckford Ethics and Integrity Commissioner” (RTO Online: 2006) online:
<http://www.rtoonline.com/Content/Article/May06/CanadianPaydayLoanAssociationAp
pointsPickfordEthics050406.asp>.
131
“Code of Best Business Practices” (Canadian Payday Loan Association: Hamilton,
2008) online: <http://www.cpla-acps.ca/english/consumercode.php>. Recall that in most
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from granting loan extensions for a fee, or from advancing a new loan to
pay down an existing loan. The Code also prohibits multiple loans in
excess of the initial amount the lender was approved for, and prevents
lenders from taking collateral. Further, it sets a limit on the amount a
member may charge on the default of the loan, and only allows lenders to
charge post-maturity interest at a rate of $0.90/week for the first 13 weeks,
and $0.50 per week thereafter.
Members are also required to recommend credit counseling to any
customer who has defaulted twice within a year, and offer to forego
accrual of interest for customers who do go into counseling. There are also
restrictions on the type of loans that a member may offer – a member may
not give a loan based on some social assistance payments or take an
assignment of wages, neither may they grant a loan over $1500 or a loan
for a term of over 31 days.
The Code also has similar requirements to many of the provinces’
proposed or enacted legislation, in allowing no-penalty cancellation of the
loan if done by the end of the next business day. It also stipulates that the
member should disclose to the customer the “high-cost nature of the
payday loan on all loan documentation.”132 Notably, however, the one
area that the Code does not touch on is the amount that can be charged in
fees and interest (until maturity) on loans.
This Code is enforced by the Office of Ethics and Integrity Commissioner,
a position funded by CPLA but designed to operate independently.133 Any
complaints about a violation of the Code are made via a 1-800 number
staffed by a full time Compliance Officer who will determine which
prospective violations require further action, and will make submissions
with recommendations on each violation for the Commissioner. The
Commissioner then has the mandate to investigate and follow-up on any
violations brought to his attention; he also has the ability to issue
“horror stories” about payday loans in the press, the journalist will give the example of a
person who got a rollover loan and ended up making payments for months without
paying down the initial loan because the loan was rolled over.
132
Ibid.
133
“About the Office of the Ethics and Integrity Commissioner” (Canadian Payday Loan
Association:
Hamilton,
2008)
online:
<http://www.cplaethicscommissioner.ca/english/about.html>.
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warnings, or fine or otherwise discipline members who have not complied
with the Code. In 2007, 164 complaints were made via the 1-800 number
or email; 87 were deemed to merit further investigation; in 16 cases the
Commissioner concluded a violation occurred; 10 members were
sanctioned and the other 6 responded with a “satisfactory resolution” to
the matter.134

IV. CALLING ON CANADIAN PAYDAY LENDERS
On March 22 and March 28, 2008, a female student research assistant,
along with a male research partner visited 4 different payday lenders in
downtown Toronto. In two cases, two locations of the payday lender
where visited, totaling 6 visits. The research assistant who conducted the
visits is a third year Osgoode Hall Law School student who is white, in her
mid-twenties, has worked with the author on payday lending research for
over three months, and has seven years of post-secondary education. Her
male friend, a third year medical student, is also white and in his midtwenties.
The instruction provided to the student was to obtain all the information
that she could about how much it would cost to obtain a payday loan and
what she was required to do in order to obtain the loan. The student has
asked that her identity is kept anonymous as she is joining a law firm upon
graduation from law school that represents a major player in the payday
lending industry.

A. ONTARIO DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR PAYDAY LENDERS
Section 61.1(4) of the Consumer Protection Act requires the following
statements:
1.
2.

134

Total Cost of Borrowing per each $100 as heading (larger font)
Subheading indicating “$300 loan for 14 days” (smaller font)

Annual Report, supra note 129 at 7.
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"Principal Amount $300.00" AND "Total Cost of Borrowing"
followed by the total cost of borrowing per each $300 advanced
under the agreement
Horizontal line
“Total to Repay”
“This sign conforms to the disclosure requirements under the
CPA”

The visits to the payday lenders indicated that most of the required terms
were provided as per statutory requirements, however, payday lenders’
interpretation of the terms varied widely. The following table highlights
the difficulty in trying to ascertain how much each loan cost and to
compare the cost of borrowing as between the different lenders.
Table 1
Disclosure
Requirements

Money Mart

Cash Money

Cash Shop

Cash Store

Total Cost of
Borrowing per
$100
(larger font)
“Example: $300
loan for 14 days”
(smaller font)
"Principal
Amount”
"Total Cost of
Borrowing"

$1.78 and $19.45
with optional
cheque cashing fees

$20.00

$20.00

$22.26
*($100 includes a $20
broker fee)

No number
included.

$60.00

No number
included.

No number included.

$300.00

$300.00

$300.00

$300.00

$5.34

$60.00

$66.79

“Total to Repay”

$305.34

$20.00 per $100
borrowed
$60.00 per $300
borrowed
$360.00

$360.00

“This sign
conforms to the
disclosure
requirements
under the CPA”

Included.

Included.

Included.

$306.79
* Does not reflect the
net amount received;
reflects the gross
amount borrowed.
Included.

* This statement is printed on the Cash Store’s Disclosure Poster
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B. VISITS TO 6 TORONTO PAYDAY LENDERS
At each location, the student asked the following five questions. The
responses below are in her language. She relied on her research partner to
aid with data collection. He would enter the store after she had left (or as
she was leaving) and collect any promotional material they might have
had. After her departure from two of the six locations, the store employee
commented, without prompting, to the rest of individuals in the store on
‘how many questions’ she had asked, and that it was ‘funny’ for her to
want to write things down. These statements clearly indicate that the
student’s haphazard way of collecting information was, in comparison to
other payday borrowers, quite exceptional.

1.

What is a payday loan?
Most operators replied that a payday loan is a short-term loan.
They would provide me with a certain amount of money, which I
am expected to pay back on my next payday. This was usually
about 10 days, but could be extended or reduced depending on the
next time I would get paid.

2.

What do I need to provide to qualify for a payday loan?
The following documents were required for me to apply for a loan.
But, it was not a guarantee of whether or not I’d be accepted. The
employees assured me that qualifying would take less then 10
minutes. But when I asked what the process would involve (ie.
calling employers etc…) they didn’t answer but instead refocused
my attention on how fast it would be.
Money Mart: A current bank statement; latest pay stub; postdated personal cheque
Cash Money: Pay stub; personal cheque; bank statement (from
today or the day before).
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Cash Shop: Proof of continuous employment at the same job for
six months; get paid through direct deposit; no more then 1 Non
Sufficient Fund fee in the past 2 months; 2 pay stubs; 2 pieces of
ID; A utility/phone bill; an updated bank statement for the last 45
days
Cash Store: a current bank statement; latest pay stub; personal
cheque; utility bill; personal references (family members who had
landlines were preferred).
3.

What is the most money I could get?
All locations began by stipulating that I could get approved for up
to 50% of my net salary. Cash Shop said that since “I looked ok”
they would be able to go up to 70%. Cash Money also said that
they could go up to 70% for repeat customers who had a ‘positive
relationship’ with Cash Money.

4.

How much does it cost to borrow?
Each employee pointed to the poster and proceeded to read the
poster to me. When I asked specifically what the terms ‘cost of
borrowing’ and ‘total to repay’ meant, they declined to answer.
The Term ‘Total Cost of Borrowing’ varies widely from $5.34 and
$66.79. Furthermore Cash Money’s use of the term is confusing by
stating the $20.00 first, even though the example asks for the $300
example … which would then be $60.00.
The term ‘Total to Repay’ is also widely misinterpreted. You can
see that Cash Money and Cash Shop are relatively
straightforward, the consumer should repay $360.00 and one
could assume that would be the total written on my post-dated
cheque or direct transfer form. However, Money Mart and Cash
Store indicate substantially lower levels of ‘Total to Repay’. But
these totals do not include the brokerage and optional cheque
cashing fees, which are in most cases mandatory charges.
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At Cash Store, I was told that the brokerage fees were mandatory,
and were due to the fact that the Cash Store ‘linked, me, the
borrower with an independent lender’. Cash Store did not actually
lend me the money themselves. I still do not know what total I
would be required to write on my post-dated cheque.
The optional cheque cashing fees employed by Money Mart were
the most confusing. All their advertising indicates that they charge
59% interest, or about 90 cents/week per 100 dollar loan. However
the advertising also seems to indicate that there is an ‘optional’
cheque cashing fee. Upon prompting, the store employee told me
that if I paid back the loan in full on the loan due date (the day
before my payday) I would pay the advertised rates. However, if I
waited until payday, Money Mart would cash my cheque and
charge an extra $19.95 per 100 dollars. This was seen as a
convenience fee, and the employee stressed this was optional …
kind of like valet parking. However, I find it very difficult to believe
how someone who has limited income, and took out a loan in the
first place, would then be able to pay it off BEFORE the receive
their regular salary. Thus the vast majority of borrowers are
forced to pay this convenience fee.
I’m also concerned with the widespread use of the word ‘AND’ as
opposed to ‘PLUS’. While it’s a small change (and not illegal) I
don’t think it conveys to the consumer that they are also
responsible for this charge.
5.

Can I get a copy of the information?
Once they began providing details, I would ask if they had any
information written down. They usually had written information
pertaining to the materials I needed to bring in to qualify for a
loan. However, none of the information about prices was written
down, although they did let me copy the information on the poster
down by hand when I prompted. I clandestinely took the photos
with my cell phone.
I was able to get two loan applications. On Cash Shop’s
application there appears to be a statement about wage
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assignment—which is not legal in Ontario. [Pursuant to The
Wages Act, 1990, payday lenders are prohibited from taking wage
assignments under Subsection 7 (7), which states that an
assignment of wages to secure payment of a debt is invalid. In
addition, a representation that such assignments are valid may be
considered a false, misleading or deceptive representation under
the Consumer Protection Act, 2002.]
6.

What if I can’t pay the loan back?
On both the Cash Store and Money Mart’s website it clearly says
that no rollovers are permitted.
The Cash Shop indicated that if I couldn’t pay off the loan that they
would be able renegotiate something with me. Cash Store also said
that I must pay off the loan, but if I thought that there was no other
way … then I was supposed to come into the store and talk to them
before my next payday.
Cash Money also indicated that I would have to pay off the loan on
my next payday. But if I was in dire circumstances they would wait
one or two days before cashing the cheque. The Cash Money
employee also said that I should consider using the ‘pick up’
option to pay off my loan. If I come in on my payday (not the day
before) and pay my loan in full, in cash, then they would
immediately loan me the same amount of my previous loan. This,
she indicated, was considered a new loan and I would have to pay
new fees associated with taking out a loan. The Cash Money
employee said the vast majority of individuals preferred the pickup option.
I thought it was rather odd that people would want to go through
the trouble of going to the payday loan, rather then letting the
cheque clear, since at Cash Money there is no cheque cashing
convenience fee. In other words, it would cost the same to pick up
the loan or to let the cheque clear. She said that if individuals
waiting 2 or 3 days for the cheque to clear, they would not be able
to take out another loan (since borrowers are only allowed one
loan at a time). With the pick-up option, they could take out the
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new loan on the same day. One could assume therefore, that not
only is this pick-up option a rollover, but that the majority of
borrowers rely upon them.
Even Money Mart, who prohibits rollovers under the CPLA Best
Practices, stated I could apply for a ‘back-to-back’ loan. If I had
enough funds to clear the first cheque, Money Mart would
immediately loan me the exact amount that was just cleared from
my account. While not technically a rollover, the risk of debt
spiral would still be present— as I would never have enough
money to clear the loan and provide for myself for the next two
weeks. Money Mart would also receive new fees from my ‘back-toback’ loan every two weeks. For example, if I pursued ‘back-toback’ loans for one year (26 loans) on a principal amount of $300
I would pay roughly $60 in interest every two weeks. In this case,
Money Mart would receive over $1,560 in interest (520% APR),
for a $300 loan.
The student reports the following conclusion regarding her experience in
attempting to get a payday loan and the relevant information:
I found it very difficult to determine how much the loan would
ultimately cost me. I am therefore quite adamant in saying that the
average payday loan consumer may not know how much they are
paying for their loan when they sign the agreement, nor are they
fully capable of ‘‘shopping around’ to find the best deal.
I am even more convinced of my conclusion when one thinks that
all payday loan borrowers, through the act of looking for a loan,
are already under financial stress and will not be in the more
contemplative state-of-mind I was experiencing. (i.e. I didn’t
actually need the loan to pay for groceries, facing the risk of
eviction etc…) The stress of ‘getting the money now’ would
drastically impair one’s ability to effectively compute the highly
complicated and intentionally confusing information associated
with payday loans.
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V. AMERICAN REGULATORY LESSONS
In contrast to the more mature American payday lending industry, and
accompanying attempts at regulation, the Canadian payday lending
industry is new and until fairly recently has been unregulated.
Accordingly, this section reviews the dominant American approaches
taken to regulate payday lenders with a view to drawing regulatory lessons
for the Canadian context.

A. DISCLOSURE
The provincial regulation requires disclosure in the form of posted
warnings and information in agreements about the cost of credit and the
high cost of the loans. Commentators reflecting on the American
experience with disclosure as a tool for limiting predatory practices used
by payday lenders suggest that disclosure should be made in the form of
clear costs of borrowing rather than APR. That is, it should be clearly
stated that a loan will cost, for example, $20 for $100 borrowed for one
week, totaling $120 for one week. Any additional fees should also be
clearly noted. The total cost should be posted clearly at the front of the
store or on the counter in a similar fashion to the way that banks post the
daily exchange rate. In addition, the posted notice should clearly indicate
that these loans are intended to be short-term. The Ontario legislation, like
the other proposed and proclaimed provincial legislation, attempts to
provide for this information, however, as was evidenced by the on-site
visits, the variation in the way that this information was provided made it
difficult to understand and also difficult to compare among stores.
Doubt is cast on the potential of disclosure as a regulatory tool by the
research on bounded rationality that suggests that consumers do not
always act in the rational way that underlies the rationale for disclosure.135
As is highlighted by the research on the American experience with
disclosure regulation, various other factors, such as convenience and sunk
search costs, may limit the utility of disclosure.136 On the other hand, the
135
136

Ramsay, supra note 24 at 30.
Ibid.
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provision of comparative price and term information by a neutral third
party has been put forward as the most effective form of disclosure.137
None of the current provincial regulatory schemes or proposals provide for
this relatively low-cost measure.

B. LICENSING
Licensing of payday lenders by third party provincially regulated bodies
holds the potential to address the issues surrounding the utility of
disclosure. In addition to serving a gatekeeping function, such bodies are
in a position to provide an effective form of information disclosure,
including comparative information. To assist customers with shopping
around prior to visiting a payday lender, licensees should be required to
provide daily reports of fees to the licensor, who should in turn make these
available to potential borrowers on the internet or through other means.
Further, on-site visits from provincial regulators may deter lenders from
making oral representations that contradict posted disclosure, disclosure in
agreements, or provincial legislation. The on-site visits to the Toronto
payday lenders illustrate that large operators are violating the selfregulatory standards they helped craft surrounding rollovers, for example.
The funding for on-site visits would come from licensing costs paid by the
payday lenders. The challenge will be for the licensing body to resist
becoming “captured” by the payday lending industry. This concern should
be factored into decisions surrounding the appropriate licensing
framework. That is, whether the licensor should be within the provincial
consumer affairs ministry or a delegated administrative authority where an
arm’s length agency administers the regime. The provinces where there is
a public utility commission or board appear to have delegated authority to
these semi autonomous provincially regulated bodies. The other provinces
appear to have taken the former approach.

137

Ibid.
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C. ROLLOVERS
Each province that has put forward regulation has prohibited rollovers or
charging an additional fee for a rollover. This prohibition is also found in
the industry’s self-regulation. Given that rollovers are a clearly a regular
practice associated with the business model for payday lenders operating
in Canada, and that the existing prohibition imposed by payday lenders’
self-regulatory body is ignored by lenders, a different approach is
necessary. It may be more reasonable to regulate the conditions for a
rollover to take place and to require disclosure of not only the cost of the
loan but also the cost of a rollover. In addition, a cap may be set on the
number of times a rollover may be permitted and posted warnings about
the high cost of rollovers may be considered.

D. ENFORCEMENT
While class actions have entered the scene as an attempt to use the judicial
system to obtain a remedy for usurious interest rates charged by payday
lenders, the results remain to be seen. Class actions aside, most low
income borrowers will not have the resources to take action in court
against payday lenders. Accordingly, the most effective method for
enforcing the requirements in the new legislation is a simple vehicle for
complaint to the licensor that will result in non-recovery of the loan
amount by the lender. A number of the proposed or existing provincial
regimes merely provide that the interest will not be recoverable if the
legislation is violated. This is an insufficient form of deterrence; the
principle and interest should not be repayable. Detailed statistics should
be kept on all on-site visits, complaints, and resolutions.

E. EDUCATION AND COUNSELING
In contrast to some American states counselling has not been adopted as
part of the provincial regulatory models. While there has been much
criticism regarding the counselling requirement for bankruptcy in Canada,
it may be a helpful tool, when used in conjunction with the other tools
discussed, in this context. Potential borrowers should be required to
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participate in counseling session prior to taking a second payday loan in a
set period of time or attempting to rollover a payday loan. Such sessions
may be provided online for literate consumers or in person and should be
financed through the payday lenders, but provided by the government
through the licensing body or another delegated authority. The counseling
cost should not be passed on to potential borrowers.
The main criticism leveled against counseling in the bankruptcy context is
that it adopts a “blame the victim” approach and focuses on helping the
debtor adopt better financial management practices. While in some
instances instruction on better budgeting practices may be helpful, often
low income debtors will simply not have the money available to budget
with. It would be more useful to outline the borrower’s rights with respect
to their outstanding payday loans. For example, the fact that it is not cost
effective for payday lenders to commence an action against a borrower for
an unpaid loan, may be helpful information to a debtor contemplating her
options. In addition, a detailed explanation of the costs associated with
rolling over a loan and exploration of other possible sources of longer term
credit may be helpful.
Consideration should also be given to introducing some form of financial
education into the high school curriculum or even college and university
level curriculum. In addition, public education sessions financed by the
licensing fees paid by payday lenders and held by licensors would be
helpful. The OPLEF provided for under the new Ontario legislation
provides a model for this approach. The implementation of either form of
education should not be used to justify limiting other measures such as
disclosure or interest rate caps.

F. INTEREST RATE CAPS
As increased regulatory measures are imposed on payday lenders they will
undoubtedly argue that these measures will drive them out of business.
The democratization of credit that payday lenders have helped facilitate is
not in itself a bad thing and should not be treated as such. The Quebec
experience, where registration and a maximum interest cap of 35 per cent
are in place, and where there are no payday lenders operating in the
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jurisdiction may be used to illustrate the impact that regulatory decisions
may have on the continued viability of the industry. However, it is
important to highlight that Credit Unions have played a much more
prevalent role in the Quebec alternative credit market, and accordingly,
interest rate caps are not a complete explanation.138 Further, the American
experience suggests that payday lenders can adapt their business model to
a regulated lending environment with interest rate caps. In implementing
interest rate caps, it will be important to follow Ramsay’s line of
reasoning, “there is probably a convincing argument that may be made for
using interest rate ceilings as a method of protecting against excessive
rates but not as a means of second guessing market rates.” Market rates in
this context need to account for the current practice of not performing
credit checks or detailed assessments of ability to pay prior to providing
payday loans to borrowers in Canada. Introducing such practices in this
market will limit access to credit for groups of borrowers that are
otherwise excluded from accessing credit and potentially push them into
even more expensive and unregulated arenas.
To date, other than Quebec, only Manitoba has settled on an interest rate
cap. A formula that attaches both to the changing markets and limits on
excessive rates will need to be developed as the other provinces move
forward. Consultation on appropriate rates should not be limited to the
lenders or financial experts, but should also include poverty experts and
payday loan consumers.

G. PROVINCIAL HARMONIZATION
The Uniform Law Conference of Canada appears to have given limited
attention to the issue of payday lenders following the amendment to the

138

Ibid. at 37. Given that the Federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over
banking, interests and negotiable instruments and the provinces over property and civil
rights, there may be a constitutional issue related to the provinces setting interest rate
caps. However, as Mary Anne Waldron has concluded, “while the Federal government
was given the exclusive power to legislate on interest in the constitution, the provincial
legislatures have been permitted by the courts to care out a significant and, perhaps
widening sphere of jurisdiction.” M. Waldron, The Law of Interest in Canada (Caswell:
1992) at 28, as cited in Ramsay supra note 24 at 27.
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Criminal Code giving the provinces the ability to regulate in this area.139
The Consumer Measures Committee (CMC), a federal-provincialterritorial intergovernmental working group that seeks national approaches
to consumer protection issues has also give the issue limited
consideration.140 Ontario’s Ministry of Government Services Policy and
Consumer Protection Services Division indicates that it’s “preference is
for a harmonized national approach to regulation and interest rate setting,
with a federal lead on rate setting to create a national standard for the
industry.”141 However, to date an analysis and recommendations
surrounding the harmonization of payday lending legislation has not been
provided and multiple provincial attempts at reform appear to be
simultaneously proceeding without an attempt at national consultation.
Ramsay provided a Model Act with his report in 2000, however, a
harmonized approach has not been adopted by the provinces. It continues
to be true that vulnerable consumers’ interests and needs with respect to
payday lenders do not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction so as to justify
the variation in existing and proposed legislation in this area continue,142
however, there remains no Canadian experience to justify choosing one
regulatory approach over another.
Ultimately an effort should be made to work towards a Model Act.
However, at this early stage in seeking to regulate a previously
unregulated industry variation in provincial regulation may be a useful
way to assess the effectiveness of various approaches to regulating the
industry. In addition, future work will need to consider the limits of
domestic regulation of payday lenders and the extent to which the internet
and other technologies are facilitating payday lending across provincial
and national borders.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article has focused on assessing the evolving Canadian payday
lending regulatory framework as a discrete area of regulation of
overindebtness of low income Canadians. A detailed assessment and
comparison of the regulation of other forms of credit in the alternative
credit market was beyond the scope of the current project. The ability and
the willingness of the provinces to regulate payday loans following Bill C26 provide a unique opening. The development of ex-ante regulation that
will at the same time continue to grant low-income Canadians access to
credit through payday loans and protect them from predatory practices,
provides an occasion to reflect on best practices for regulating
overindebtness of lower income Canadians. Up until this point, for the
most part, only middle-class Canadians had access to expansive regulation
and relief from overindebtness through the bankruptcy regime. While an
increasing number of low-income Canadians now have access to credit,
they continue to have limited access to the bankruptcy regime. Apart from
measures aimed at increasing access to this ex-post remedy, the current
process of providing ex-ante relief is also promising. In order to make this
form of regulation meaningful lessons from the American experience
should be taken seriously and regulation that is helpful to the actual
consumers of payday loans should be carefully developed. An ongoing
effort should be undertaken to evaluate and compare provincial efforts at
regulation with a view to developing a domestic, and possibly in the
future, international model payday lending legislation.
The provincial reform efforts may contribute to the development of a
heightened sense of corporate social responsibility on the part of payday
lenders, which may in turn also facilitate a change in their lending
practices. As the payday lending industry expands in Canada, an
increasing number of payday loans are offered by publicly traded
corporations that are accountable to an increasing number of shareholders
and other corporate stakeholders. Future research should consider the role
of Canadian corporate and securities law in facilitating a change in the
corporate governance practices of payday lenders. In addition, further
research is necessary on the role of regulation and governance practices in
ensuring that mainstream financial institutions operate in a socially
responsible way in relation to lower income debtors.
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Canadian banks, like their American counterparts, have been quite
reluctant to deal with low-income borrowers in a more direct fashion.
They risk criticism if they reject too many customers, or charge higher
interests rates or use remedies such as foreclosure.143 Therefore, there is a
tendency for larger financial institutions to just avoid an area, making it
very attractive to predatory lenders. This practice dates back to the middle
of the twentieth century when many American banks discriminated against
certain racialized neighbourhoods through the practice of redlining.144 As
a result, Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) to
mandate financial institutions “serve the convenience and needs of the
communities in which they are chartered to do business”.145 Federal
examiners evaluate a bank’s community reinvestment efforts through three
tests in lending, investments and service.146 These ratings are published
for the public to review. The examiners can also deny applications or
place conditions on the approval of deposit facilities if the CRA ratings are
not adequate.147 The CRA seeks to balance a bank’s benefits and burdens:
banks that profit from community deposits should be encouraged to extend
credit to those same communities.148
The CRA provided some direction for the Canadian Department of
Finance's White Paper on "Reforming Canada's Financial Services
Sector."149 In that document, increased CRA-style disclosure was
recommended, but it was noted that a full CRA regime is not warranted in
Canada, and that other mechanisms could be used to promote
accountability.150 Instead of the CRA, the paper proposed that all financial
institutions with equity of over $1 billion disclose information on their
philanthropy, their employees' community service, and their efforts to
143

Hellwig, supra note 138 at 1582; MacDonnell, supra note 32 at 49.
The term redlining originated from a lender’s habit of outlining a specific ‘poor
neighbourhood’ in red to indicate and exclude the area from lending as it was too high
risk.
145
Emily Berkman, “Microloans as a Community Reinvestment Act Compliance
Strategy” (2006) N.Y.U.J.L. & Bus. 329.
146
Ibid.
147
Ibid.
148
Ibid.
149
Finance Canada, "Reforming Canada's Financial Services Sector: A Framework for
the Future" (Finance Canada, 1999).
150
Ibid.
144

2008]

REGULATING PAYDAY LENDERS IN CANADA

37

promote small businesses, micro-credit, and access to banking services.
Some of these recommendations were adopted in Bill C-8, An Act to
Establish the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada and to Amend
Certain Acts in Relation to Financial Institutions.151 The Act created the
Financial Consumer Agency, responsible for making sure banks follow
through on their obligations under the Bill, and requires institutions with
equity of over $1 billion to publish an annual "Public Accountability
Statement" providing the information detailed above.152 However, critics
feel that this is still inadequate, as it does not provide information about
demand for financing, and whether the banks are appropriately meeting
the demand.153 Nor does it produce regular data based on neighbourhood
(only by province), or by the characteristics of borrowers, unlike the
information produced under the CRA.
The inquiries into whether Canada should move closer to the United States
in adopting CRA style legislation and the role that corporate governance
practices and regulation play in improving payday lending practices are
important research questions as Canada moves forward with a regulatory
scheme that takes into account the increasing democratization of credit.
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APPENDIX A
Table 2
Provincial Payday Lending Legislation
British
Columbia

Manitoba

New
Brunswick

Nova
Scotia

Ontario

Title of
Legislation

Bill 27, Business
Practices and
Consumer
Protection
(Payday Loans)
Amendment Act

Payday Loans
Regulation;
Consumer
Protection Act
(Act)

Bill 4, An Act
Respecting
Payday Loans

Bill 87:
Consumer
Protection
Act
(amended)

Bill 48: Payday
Loans Act (2008)
(PLA)

Authority to
set Interest
Rates

Given to
Lieutenant
Governor in
Council, can set
the
maximum
amount, or
establish a rate,
formula, tariff
or method of
determining the
maximum
amount for
-interest, permissible
charges, and -the
total cost of the
loan (s. 112.02)

That authority is
found in s. 147 of
the Act, not yet
enacted

New
Brunswick
Energy and
Utilities Board
can fix the
ultimate cost
of credit
(37.31); can
also limit the
percentage of a
person’s
income as a
cap on the
amount they
can borrow
(37.36)

Lenders
can’t
charge
more than
maximum
set by Nova
Scotia
Utility and
Review
Board (18J)

Lieutenant Governor
may make
regulations
prohibiting lenders
from making a
payday loan
agreement with a
borrower if the
amount of the payday
loan exceeds the
prescribed amounts
or the amounts
calculated according
to the prescribed
manner (s.77.19,
PLA)
Lieutenant Governor
may make

Prince
Edward
Island
Bill 100,
Payday
Loans Act

Quebec

Sask.

Consumer
Protection
Act

Commission
can set a
maximum
on any
payments
that
contribute to
the cost of
credit (s. 11)

Statutory
35% APR
cap (ss. 8,
325)

An Act
Respecting
Payday Loan
Agreements,
Payday
Lenders and
Borrowers
Lieutenant
Governor in
Council will
limit the total
amount that a
payday
lender can
charge with
respect to the
loan (s. 23)
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regulations
specifying limits for
the purposes of
section 32 (Total
Cost of Borrowing)
or specifying a
method of setting
limits for the
purposes of that
section. (s.77.23,
PLA)
Cancellation
Protection

May cancel
without penalty
before the end of
the next business
day after the loan
was made, or at
any time if the
loan was made in
contravention of
other protections
in the act or
without
informing
customer of
cancellation right
(s. 112.05)

Found in s.
149(8) of the Act,
not yet enacted

May cancel
without
penalty within
48 hours
(excluding
Sundays and
holidays) of
the first
advance; or at
any time if
there is no
notification of
cancellation
rights (s.
37.29)

Can cancel
before end
of business
day after
loan is
granted, or
at any time
if not
informed of
rights
(18Q)

The borrower may
cancel, without any
reason, the agreement
at any time up to the
end of the second day
after the time that
the agreement was
signed (and the
advance received) if
the lender is open for
business. If they are
not open for business,
then the next day.
(s.30(1)(a) PLA)
If this occurs then the
effect is like the loan
never existed and the
borrower must pay
back the advance
given, and the
borrower must return
all fees and
documents associated
with the loan. (s.43,

Can cancel
within 48
hours
(excluding
Sundays and
holidays)
and any
other time if
not informed
of
cancellation
rights (s. 13)

NA

May cancel
by end of
business day
after loan
agreement
was entered
into, or at any
time if there
was no notice
of
cancellation
rights (s. 22)
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PLA)
Information in
Agreement

Must include
total cost of
credit and APR;
a statement that
interest only
applies to the
loan principal;
and a warning
that it is a “high
cost loan”; and
cancellation
rights (s. 112.06)

Must include total
cost of credit and
APR; term of
loan; itemization
of all fees; and a
statement
encouraging
customers to take
questions or
concerns to the
Consumer’s
Bureau (s. 14)
s.14 is in addition
to s.148(1)(a) [not
yet enacted]
which demands:
(i) states the date
and time of day
that the initial
advance is being
made or the card
or other device is
being provided,
(ii) states that the
loan is a high-cost
loan, (iii) gives
notice of the
borrower's right
to cancel the loan
within 48 hours
after receiving the
initial advance

Must include
total cost of
credit and
APR; each of
the fees
regulated by
the Board that
apply; a
statement a
payday loan is
a high cost
loan;
cancellation
rights and
remedies (s.
37.28)

Lender
must give
borrower in
writing
information
on exact
amount
loaned, the
exact fees,
regulated
maximum
fees, and
cancellation
rights (18I)

Lieutenant Governor
may make
regulations governing
information text, or
terms that a lender is
required to include in
a payday loan
agreement. Also may
make regulations
governing the form
that a lender is
required to use for
the information, text
or terms. (s.77.21-22,
PLA)

At the time
of loan,
borrower
must get a
document
saying that it
is a high
cost loan,
giving right
to
cancellation.
(s. 12)

NA

Before
entering into
loan, must
provide
disclosure
document
stating that
this is a high
cost loan,
include an
explanation
of all
amounts
charged, and
give notice of
cancellation
rights (s. 20)

Rollover
Prohibitions

Cannot grant
rollovers; or new

Limit on charges
for extension,

No payday
lender shall

No
rollovers,

The lender under a
payday loan

Can’t accept
payment for

NA

No
concurrent
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loan when
existing loan
exists from the
same lender (s.
112.08)

renewal or
replacement (s.
152 of Act, not
yet enacted)

grant a
rollover loan
(s. 37.34)

41

no new
loans where
loans
already
exist with
the same
lender(18N
(c)(h))

agreement shall not
enter into a new
payday loan
agreement with the
borrower before at
least seven days have
passed since the
borrower has paid the
full outstanding
balance under the
first agreement.
(s.35(1), PLA)
No loan broker shall
facilitate the making
of more than one
payday loan
agreement between
the same borrower
and different lenders
unless seven days
have passed since the
borrower has paid the
outstanding balance
under the first
agreement. (s.35(3)
of PLA)
The lender under a
payday loan
agreement shall not
extend the agreement
unless the regulations
permit extensions of
payday loan
agreements and the
extension complies

extension or
renewal of
loan except
as
authorized
by an order
of the
Commission
(s. 16)

loans are
permitted (s.
28); renewal
loans don’t
appear to be
explicitly
prohibited (s.
23 just says
that lenders
can’t charge
more than
maximum set
by regulation
for renewals)
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with the prescribed
requirements.
(s.36(1), PLA)

Licensing

Requires payday
lenders to be
licensed and
regulates aspects
of their
transactions with
consumers.
Licensing and
compliance
enforcement will
be administered
by the Business
Practices and
Consumer
Protection
Authority, a notfor-profit
organization that
operates at arm's
length from
government.
Consultation is
currently in

One year license
costs $5,500;
must provide
sample loan
documents for a
$300 loan that
complies with
regulations and an
undertaking from
director that s/he
knows about the
consumer
protection laws
(s.7, 8); licensees
must also provide
bonds (s. 10)

May apply to
Minister for
license; must
pay fee and
provide the
application
and all other
documents
required by the
Minister (s.
37.12-14);
licensee must
also provide
bond (s. 36.15)

Need
permit to
give payday
loans, can
get permit
through
registrar
and must
pay fees
(18C-D)

Lieutenant Governor
may make
regulations as to the
definition of what
constitutes an
extension of a payday
loan agreement
(s.77.24) PLA
Each payday lender
(s.6(1)), and loan
broker (s.6(2)) is
required to hold a
license issued by the
Registrar. The
Registrar can suspend
or revoke a license in
some cases. (s.12) In
selected cases, the
applicant for a license
(or a renewal) is
entitled to a hearing
before the License
Appeal tribunal.
(s.13(7))
An applicant for a
license (or renewal)
must disclose
changes in corporate
control and address.
(s.22(1)) The
Registrar may at any
time require a

Licences are
required,
need an
application
and fee to
get one (ss.
3-4)

Licenses are
only granted
to lenders
who charge
a maximum
35% APR.
There are no
legal payday
lenders in
Quebec.

Licenses are
required (s.
5-6), and
lender may
be required to
provide a
bond or other
financial
security (s. 7)
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progress on
licensing
requirements.

Posted
Warnings

Questions
pertaining to a
disclosure
regime was
included in the
BC Consultation
Paper.

Sign must say
“Payday Loans
are High-Cost
Loans” and give
the cost in dollars
for a $300 loan (s.
16)
This is in
conjunction with
s.156 [not yet
enacted]
All lenders must
post signs. The
signs must be
posted
prominently and
in accordance
with the
regulations, and
must clearly and
understandably
set out, in the
form required by
the regulations,
(a) all
components of

Payday lender
must post
signs that
clearly set out
full cost of
credit (s. 37.3)

Governor in
Council can
make
regulations
regarding
the display
of fees,
charges,
rates and
products
offered;
(18U(k))

licensee to provide
the Registrar with
copies of materials
that the licensee uses
or proposes to use in
the course of
conducting business.
(s.47(2)) (all sections
pertain to the PLA)
61.1(4) of the
Consumer Protection
Act requires specific
disclosure on the cost
of borrowing.

Must post
signs that set
out, clearly
and
prominently,
all
components
of the cost
of credit,
including
fees,
charges,
interest, etc.
(s. 20)

NA

Must post
sign setting
out costs of
all
components
of cost of
credit (s. 21)
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the cost of credit,
including all fees,
charges, penalties,
interest and other
amounts and
consideration for
a representative
payday loan
transaction; and
(b) any other
information
required by the
regulations.
Remedies

Borrower
doesn’t have to
pay or is entitled
to refund for any
money paid over
the maximum
set; if there is a
rollover,
borrower doesn’t
have to pay or is
entitled to a
refund of
anything over the
principal of the
first loan
(112.10)

An administrative
penalty (of $1000,
$3000, or $5000)
can be levied if
there is a
violation of the
maximum credit
charge or limits
on charges of
renewals (s. 19);
The lender must
reimburse
borrower for fees
charged over the
maximum (s. 147
of Act) or for
rollovers (s. 152).

If there is a
violation of the
maximum cap
on cost of
credit, then the
lender must
reimburse or
cannot charge
the borrower
for any amount
charged in
relation to the
total cost of
credit of the
loan
(37.31(2)(b); if
there’s a
rollover,
debtor is not
liable for any
amounts
relating to cost
of credit for

Registrar
can make
lenders
reimburse
borrowers
for any
expenses to
which
lenders
aren’t
entitled
(12A); If
the loan
agreement
says that
borrower
must repay
more than
maximum,
borrower
only has to
repay
principal

Registrar has the
ability to refuse
licenses, prohibit the
use of certain
practices, demand
administer-ative fines
that cannot go over
$10,000. (s. 59, PLA)
The Director can
make orders freezing
money or assets of
person involved in
proceedings that
infringe upon the
PLA. (s.52, PLA).
With regards to false
advertising: the
Director can also
order a cessation
and/or mandatory
publication of a

If the lender
violates the
cap, must
return to
borrower all
consideratio
n given to
pay for cost
of credit in
loan (s. 11);
if lender
takes fees
for rollover,
must refund
any amount
charged
there (s. 16)

NA

Lender must
refund all
loan charges
above the
maximum set
by regulation
(s. 24)

2008]
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pre-existing
loan (s. 37.34)

and not cost
of credit
(18P)

correction. (s.53(1),
PLA.)

